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Introduction 
 
Adult obesity is a thorny problem.  Several studies document rising obesity 
prevalence in the U.S. (See Mokdad et al., 1999; Mokdad et al., 2003).  
Economists have argued that the primary cause of increasing obesity 
prevalence are: (1) a falling relative price of food; (2) a technologically-induced 
shift away from physically demanding work; and (3) a decline in time spent on 
food production at home (see Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2002; Cutler, Glaeser 
and Shapiro, 2003; and Anderson, Butcher, and Levine 2003).1  As most view 
these fundamental changes in the economy as desirable and would not want to 
undo them, developing public policy to address the root causes of rising obesity 
prevalence is difficult, if not entirely problematic.   
 
Nevertheless, the health care and other costs associated with obesity are 
enormous.  For example, Wolf and Colditz (1994) estimate that over $68 billion 
annually are lost annually in increased health care costs and job absenteeism 
as a result of obesity in the U.S.  The morbidity and accounting costs 
associated with obesity have led public health experts (such as Nestle, 2003, 
Brownell and Horgen, 2003, Sturm 2002) to advocate vigorous public 
intervention, including regulation of fast food establishments and taxes on 
nutritionally-questionable foods. 
 
The economic justification for the sorts of policy interventions, such as taxes on 
food, favored by some of these authors rests on the idea that when one person 
becomes obese, many other people pay the cost.  In economic jargon, there are 
negative externalities from body weight decisions that lead to obesity.  If 
external costs are high, then public welfare can be improved by interventions 
that change the incentives adults face when making decisions about 
bodyweight.  If external costs are small, then adults pay fully for their 
                                                 
1 There are, of course, many other non-economic determinants of bodyweight, including genetic 
predispositions to obesity and non-rational impulses (such as myopic decision making and lack of self-
control) that prevent optimal bodyweight control.  These are unlikely explanations for the observed trends 
in bodyweight, even if they help explain baseline levels.  There is certainly no evidence that we are more 
irrational or have different genes than our parents or grandparents. 
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bodyweight decisions and public interventions aimed at decreasing bodyweight 
can play only a limited role in improving public welfare.2   
 
The main mechanism by which obesity imposes external costs is through 
pooled health insurance.  In a health insurance pool with inadequately risk-
adjusted premiums, one person’s increase in body weight really is everyone 
else’s business, since obesity often leads to higher medical expenditures.  In 
this paper, we describe a model of this negative obesity externality associated 
with health insurance.3   The main insight of this model is that measuring the 
obesity externality involves more than just measuring the subsidy to obese 
individuals induced by health insurance.  The welfare loss due to the obesity 
externality depends upon both the size of the subsidy and upon the extent to 
which bodyweight decisions are distorted on the margin by the subsidy—that is, 
does coverage with pooled health insurance cause enrollees to gain weight?  If 
the answer is no and there is no moral hazard of this sort caused by insurance 
coverage, then the subsidy induced by one person’s obesity would simply 
represent a transfer from the thinner individuals his insurance pool to the 
obese person, with no net effect on social welfare. 
 
Despite the importance of this parameter—the health insurance elasticity of 
body weight—to the welfare economics of obesity, there has been scant work in 
the economics literature on the topic.  The one exception is a paper by 
Markowitz and Rashad (2007) who find a zero elasticity of insurance coverage 
on body weight or obesity rates.  These authors rely on the size of a firm where 
an individual works as an instrument for insurance coverage in their body 
weight regressions.  We extend this work along three dimensions.  First, we 
measure separate elasticities for the extensive margin (people gaining or losing 
insurance altogether and the intensive margin (insurance becoming more 
generous insurance).  In principle, these elasticities may be different, and as we 
show in the concluding section of the paper, they have different policy 
implications.  Second, we distinguish different elasticities for public and private 
                                                 
2 Cawley (2004) provides a detailed discussion of possible market failures related to obesity. 
3 See Bhattacharya and Sood (2007) for a full description of this model. 
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insurance coverage for our estimates of the elasticity along the extensive 
margin.  Finally, we adopt econometric methods that account for the discrete 
nature of the insurance coverage variable. 
 
 
1 Background 
 
Americans are increasingly overweight or obese.4  The proportion of adults 
classified as obese increased from 12.0% in 1991 to 20.9% in 2001 (Mokdad et 
al., 1999; Mokdad et al., 2003).  Obesity is associated with an increased risk for 
a number of serious chronic conditions, including diabetes, hypertension, heart 
disease, and stroke (Sturm, 2002).  In this section, we provide a brief review of 
the large literature on the consequences of obesity for expected health care 
expenditures.  We also provide a review of the smaller literature on the external 
costs of obesity induced by health insurance.   
 
1.1  Obesity and health care expenditures 
Not surprisingly, expected health care expenditures are higher for obese 
individuals than for normal weight individuals.  A large number of studies 
document this fact.  The vast majority of these studies use convenience samples 
consisting of individuals from a single employer or a single insurer (Elmer et al. 
2004, Bertakis and Azari 2005, Burton et al. 1998, Raebel et al 2004).  There 
are also studies of obesity related medical expenditure differences in an 
international setting.  Both Sander and Bergemann (2003), in a German setting, 
and Katzmarzyk and Janssen (2004), in a Canadian setting, find higher medical 
expenditures for obese people. 
 
There are a few studies that use nationally representative data.  Finkelstein, et 
al. (2003) use data from the linked National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) and 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS).  They estimate that annual medical 
expenditures are $732 higher for obese than normal weight individuals.  From 
                                                 
4 Body mass index (BMI) is the standard of bodyweight in the medical literature.  BMI is weight, measured 
in kilograms, divided by height, measured in meters, squared.  Individuals with a BMI between 25 and 30 
are considered overweight, while those with a BMI of 30 or more are considered obese (National Institute 
on Health, 1998). Henceforth, we use BMI and bodyweight interchangeably. 
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an accounting viewpoint, approximately half of the estimated $78.5 billion in 
medical care spending in 1998 attributable to excess bodyweight was financed 
through private insurance (38%) and patient out-of-pocket payments (14%).  
Sturm (2002), using data from the Health Care for Communities (HCC) survey, 
finds that obese individuals spend $395 per year more than non-obese 
individuals on medical care.  Thorpe et al (2004) also use MEPS data, but they 
are interested in how much of the $1,100 increase between 1987 and 2000 in 
per-capita medical expenditures is attributable to obesity.  Using a regression 
model to calculate what per-capita medical expenditures would have been had 
1987 obesity levels persisted to 2000, they conclude that about $300 of the 
$1,100 increase is due to the rise in obesity prevalence. 
 
This is a large literature, which space constraints prevent us from surveying in 
more detail.  The many studies that we do not discuss here vary considerably in 
generality—some examine data from a single company or from a single 
insurance source—though they all reach the same qualitative conclusion that 
obesity is associated with higher medical care costs.5 
 
1.2  External costs of obesity associated with health insurance 
Despite the extensive literature on medical expenditure differences, very few 
studies attempt to estimate the degree to which health insurance coverage leads 
to subsidies for the obese.  Some studies have attempted to estimate how much 
of obesity related medical costs are subsidized by public insurance. Finkelstein, 
Ruhm and Kosa (2005), in a literature review of the causes and consequences of 
obesity, estimate that “the government finances roughly half the total annual 
medical costs attributable to obesity.  As a result, the average taxpayer spends 
approximately $175 per year to finance obesity related medical expenditures 
among Medicare and Medicaid recipients.”  To arrive at this conclusion, they 
rely on a study by Finkelstein, Fiebelkorn, and Wang (2004), who calculate 
state and federal level estimates of Medicare and Medicaid expenditures 
attributable to obesity.  Another study, conducted by Daviglus et al (2004), 
                                                 
5 Some of the studies we reviewed, but arbitrarily do not discuss here include Bungam et al. (2003); Musich 
et al. (2004); Quesenberry, Jr. et al. (1998); Thompson et al. (2001); and Wang et al. (2003). 
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links together data from a sample of Chicago area workers in the labor force 
between 1967-73, to Medicare claims records from the 1990s.  They estimate 
substantial obesity related differences in Medicare expenditures.  For example, 
women workers who were obese between 1967 and 1973 spent $176,947 in the 
1990s on Medicare, while analogous non-obese, non-overweight female workers 
spent $100,431 in undiscounted costs.  Obese male workers spent $125,470, 
while non-obese non-overweight male workers spent $76,866. 
 
However, estimating how much of obesity related medical costs are financed by 
public insurance is merely an accounting exercise and not sufficient for 
calculating the true economic subsidy for obesity.  Conceptually, calculating the 
size of the subsidy also requires estimating payments by obese and non-obese 
individuals for enrolling in health insurance in addition to the expected benefits 
of enrollment.  Roughly speaking, obese and non-obese people alike pay for 
Medicare when they are under 65 and spend (receive benefits) when they are 
older.6  Since obese people work, earn, are taxed, and die at different rates than 
non-obese people, looking at Medicare expenditure differences alone will paint a 
misleading picture of the Medicare subsidy for the obese. 
 
Calculating the obesity subsidy induced by private insurance also requires 
estimating both payments for health insurance and medical expenditures.  
Since private insurance is typically provided in an employment setting, it is not 
enough to look at premiums for health insurance paid by employers and 
employees.7  The key question is whether employers adjust the cash wages of 
obese workers with health insurance in order to account for the higher cost of 
insuring these workers.  Although theory predicts that employers would have 
incentives to do so (Rosen 1986), in practice, it is not clear that they would be 
                                                 
6 For example, McClellan and Skinner (1999, 2005) and Bhattacharya and Lakdawalla (2005), in 
estimating Medicare progressivity, estimate lifetime profiles of tax receipts for Medicare as well as 
Medicare expenditures. 
7 For employees enrolling in the same insurance plan, premiums do not depend upon bodyweight (see 
Keenan et al., 2001), so in that case, there are no obesity related payment differences.  However, when 
employers offer multiple health plans, obese workers may tend to select into a different set of plans than 
their thinner colleagues.  In that case, premiums may differ.   
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able to make these adjustments.8  According to Gruber (2000), “...the problems 
of preference revelation in this context are daunting; it is difficult in reality to 
see how firms could appropriately set worker specific compensating 
differentials.” 
 
As is the case with Medicare, however, there is very little research on obesity 
related payment differences in a private insurance settling.  An important 
exception is Bhattacharya and Bundorf (2005), who find some evidence that 
obese workers receive lower pay than non-obese workers primarily at firms that 
provide health insurance. 
 
In related work, Keeler et al (1989) and Manning et al. (1991), using data from 
the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (RAND HIE) and from the National 
Health Interview Survey (NHIS), report estimates of lifetime medical costs 
attributable to physically inactivity (rather than obesity): “At a 5 percent rate of 
discount, the lifetime subsidy from others to those with a sedentary life style is 
$1,900.”  Though they label this estimate the “external cost of physical 
inactivity,” like the rest of the literature they focus on physical inactivity related 
medical expenditure differences, while ignoring payment differences that occur 
outside experimental settings in their calculation of the subsidy. 
 
2 A Model of the Social Costs of Obesity 
 
The model timeline in Figure 1 illustrates the basic setup of the model.  Each 
consumer starts with an initial endowment of weight W0.  This endowment 
might be seen as reflecting the consumer’s genetic propensity to be overweight 
                                                 
8 The literature on medical expenditure associated obesity costs has a parallel and often intersecting 
literature on the labor market productivity costs associated with obesity (often these latter costs are called 
“indirect” costs of obesity).  The theory of compensating wage differentials has important implications for 
whether these labor market costs are external; that is, whether obese individuals pay for lower productivity 
levels (such as through more sick days) associated with their bodyweight, or someone else pays.  This 
theory suggests that obese workers will pay for lower productivity through reduced wages.  The economics 
literature on obesity related wage differences—for example, Register and William (1990), Pagan and 
Davila (1997), and Cawley (2000)—unanimously finds that obese workers earn lower wages than their 
thinner colleagues, and that these differences are equal to or greater than the wages differences that would 
arise from measurable productivity differences.  Hence, both theory and evidence suggest that these 
“indirect” costs of obesity are not external. 
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or obese, and in any case it cannot be chosen by the consumer.  In the first 
stage consumers decide how much weight to lose, ω .  Weight loss (exercising, 
dieting) gives consumers some disutility but has two associated benefits: (1) it 
increases productivity, consequently raising consumer income and (2) it 
improves health (more precisely, it decreases the probability of falling sick).9  
Falling sick entails additional medical care expenditures, but since consumers 
are insured, they are reimbursed for all of these additional medical care 
expenditures.  In the second stage, nature reveals a health shock with i = 1…N 
points of support.10  Each type of health shock entails additional medical 
expenses, iM .  Consumers first observe this health shock and then decide how 
much to consume.  The consumers’ problem is to maximize expected utility by 
jointly choosing weight change (ω ) and a consumption plan { }Ni iC =1 for each of 
the N possible health states: 
 
(1) { } ( ) ( ) ( ),maxNi i
N
i i
C i
EU W U C
ω
π ω ω
= =
= − −Φ∑
1
0
1
 
where ( )iU C  represents utility from consumption; ( )i Wπ ω−0  is the probability 
of health state i given weight ( )W ω−0 ; iC is the consumption in health state i; 
and, ( )ωΦ  is the disutility from weight loss. 
 
We divide our analysis now into two cases: (1) health insurance pools risk 
across people with heterogeneous risk (so that premiums do not change with 
bodyweight); and (2) people pay the risk-adjusted premiums for their own 
bodyweight.  The primary difference between these cases manifests itself in 
consumer budget constraints. 
 
2.1 Risk pooling 
                                                 
9 The model can also be interpreted as a model of weight gain, with a reinterpretation of the source of 
disutility from this gain (diminished body image, perhaps).  The main point is that a change in weight away 
from the optimum choice induces disutility. 
10 The results of the model are similar when health shocks are permitted to be continuous, but the solution 
technology is less transparent. 
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In this case, health risk is pooled across people of different bodyweight.  As long 
as the pool size is large enough, a single individual’s medical expenditures will 
have a negligible effect on the common premium, P , charged to everyone in the 
pool.  Hence, from the point of view of each individual, premiums are taken as 
fixed, and the budget constraint is: 
 
(2) ( )  iiI W C Pω+ = + ∀0  
 
In (2), ( )I W ω+0  is the income earned by an individual who weighs W ω+0 .  By 
allowing income to depend upon weight, we are modeling the effect of health on 
labor market productivity.  We assume that ( ).I ′ > 0 . 
 
The budget constraint specifies that in each health state i, income equals 
expenditures on consumption and health insurance premiums.  An immediate 
consequence of (2) is that consumption is identical in each health state, which 
makes sense since consumers are fully insured against medical expenditures.   
 
The consumer’s problem is to maximize expected utility, (1), subject to the 
budget constraint, (2).  We solve the consumer’s problem using standard 
discrete numerical programming methods. In the first step, taking the amount 
of weight and as given, we calculate the optimal demand for consumption in 
each health state.  Inputting the optimal consumption plan in the utility 
function gives the maximum utility attainable in each health state.  In the 
second stage, we choose weight to maximize expected utility given optimal 
consumption in each health state. 
 
Plugging the budget constraint into (1), we reformulate the consumers’ problem 
in the second stage: 
 
(3) ( )( ) ( )max EU U I W Pω ω ω= − − −Φ0  
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The first order condition for the consumer’s maximization problem is: 
 
(4) ( ) ( )( ) ( )* * *I W U I W Pω ω ω′ ′ ′− − − − −Φ =0 0 0  
 
Here, *ω  is the consumer’s optimal weight in the pooling case.  The first term in 
equation (4) is the marginal gain from weight loss; it is entirely due to the 
marginal increase in income from increased productivity arising from weight 
loss (scaled by the marginal utility of consumption).  In equilibrium, consumers 
will lose weight until the marginal gain from weight loss equals the marginal 
disutility from weight loss. 
 
If the insurance market is in competitive equilibrium, then premiums will be 
actuarially fair.  They will equal the expected medical expenses for individuals 
in the insurance pool: 
 
(5) ( )*N i i
i
P W Mπ ω
=
= −∑ 0
1
 
 
Equation (4) also shows that since consumers are fully insured against medical 
expenses, the only incentive for weight loss is the increase in income due to 
weight loss.  Thus, when insurance premiums do not depend on weight, 
consumers do not view the reduction in medical expenditures as an additional 
benefit of weight loss when making decisions about bodyweight.  Insurance 
induces a form of moral hazard with respect to weight loss incentives since the 
benefits of weight loss are not fully internalized by the consumer.  As a 
consequence, weight loss creates a positive externality for everyone else in the 
insurance pool, since it lowers their health insurance premiums.11  Because 
this benefit is not fully captured by the consumer losing the weight, insured 
people will tend to lose less weight than would be optimal.  By contrast, the 
productivity benefits of weight loss are fully internalized as changes in 
productivity lead to an increase in consumer income. 
                                                 
11 This argument is developed in more detail in Appendix A. 
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2.2 Risk-adjusted insurance 
We now turn to the case where health insurance premiums adjust to reflect the 
weight choice of consumers.  In contrast to the previous case, where the 
premium is taken as fixed, consumers now face a risk-adjusted schedule of 
health insurance premiums that depends upon their own bodyweight.  In the 
context of employer provided insurance this could be achieved by wage 
reductions for obese employees, or simply by offering premium rebates to 
individuals who lose weight.  In this case, the budget constraint is given by: 
 
(6) ( ) ( )  iiI W C P Wω ω− = + − ∀0 0  
 
Here, ( )P W ω−0  is the health insurance premium for an individual who weighs 
W ω−0 .  Again, if the insurance market is competitive, premiums will be 
actuarially fair.  Hence, they will be an increasing function of weight, reflecting 
the increase in expected medical expenses: 
 
(7) ( ) ( )N i i
i
P W W Mω π ω
=
⎛ ⎞− = −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑0 01  
 
The consumers’ problem in this case can be reformulated as: 
 
(8) ( ) ( )( ) ( )max EU U I W P Wω ω ω ω= − − − −Φ0 0  
 
The first order condition for the consumer’s maximization problem is: 
 
(9) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )** ** ** ** **I W P W U I W P Wω ω ω ω ω⎡ ⎤′ ′ ′ ′− − − − − − − −Φ =⎣ ⎦0 0 0 0 0  
 
Here, **ω  is the consumer’s optimal weight in the risk-adjusted case.  Clearly, 
(9) is necessary for **ω  to be individually optimal, but whether it is also socially 
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optimal depends upon what is meant by social optimality.  Suppose EU  is the 
expected utility of the representative consumer in the economy, and all 
individuals start with the same initial weight, W0.  In that (unrealistic) case, **ω  
can be said to be socially optimal, since the full social costs of bodyweight 
decisions are internalized.  In the Appendix, we consider a more realistic case 
where W0 differs across individuals in the population.  We show that, aside from 
transfers that do not depend upon final weight, **W ω−0 , equation (9) is a 
necessary condition for the social optimum. 
 
It is instructive to compare the first order condition in (9) with the analogous 
condition in (4) when there was a single risk pool.  Both equations have a single 
term reflecting the marginal costs of weight loss: ( ).′Φ .  However, equation (9) 
has two terms, ( ).I ′  and ( ).P′ , reflecting the marginal benefit of weight loss 
accruing from an increase in productivity and a decrease in the health 
insurance premium.  By contrast, equation (4) has only a single term reflecting 
the marginal productivity benefit of weight loss: ( ).I ′ .  Thus, when premiums 
reflect individual health risk, consumers have two incentives for weight loss—
productivity gains and lower health insurance premiums.  In this case, there is 
no moral hazard induced by health insurance and consumer bodyweight 
decisions.   
 
2.3 Deadweight loss from the obesity externality 
In this section, we show that the size of the loss in social welfare from the 
obesity externality under pooled premiums depends upon both the fact that 
expected health expenditures are higher for the obese and also upon how 
responsive people would be in their weight loss decisions to a switch from 
pooled to risk-adjusted premiums.  This calculation is important because, while 
there is a lot of empirical evidence that obese people are more likely to have 
higher medical care expenditures than non-obese people, there is no empirical 
evidence on whether pooled insurance causes obesity or weight gain.  Whether 
the rise in obesity prevalence is a public health crisis, or merely a private crisis 
for many people, depends on the evidence on both quantities. 
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We start with the expression for expected utility, evaluated at the optimum 
under risk-adjusted insurance: 
 
(10) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )** ** ** **EU U I W P Wω ω ω ω= − − − −Φ0 0  
 
We have imposed the condition that consumption does not vary with health 
outcome since consumers are fully insured under both cases. 
 
Next, we consider a first order Taylor series approximation of (10) around *ω , 
which is optimal weight loss under pooled insurance: 
 
(11) ( ) ( ) ( )
*
** * ** *EUEU EU
ω
ω ω ω ωω
∂≈ + −∂  
 
The deadweight loss (DWL) from the obesity externality is the change in 
expected utility resulting from pooling.  Equation (11) suggests an 
approximation to this quantity: 
 
(12) ( ) ( )
*
** * EUDWL EU EU
ω
ω ω ωω
∂= − ≈ Δ∂  
 
Here, ** *ω ω ωΔ ≡ −  is difference between optimal weight under risk-adjusted and 
pooled risk cases.  Since weight is socially optimal in the risk-adjusted case, ωΔ  
also reflects the degree to which weight choice differs from socially optimal 
when pooling pertains. 
 
Using a first order Taylor series approximation, the dead weight loss (DWL) in 
expected utility terms due to the obesity externality is: 
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(13) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }* * * * *DWL U I W P W I W P Wω ω ω ω ω ω⎡ ⎤′ ′ ′ ′≈ − − − − − + − −Φ Δ⎣ ⎦0 0 0 0
 
Substituting the first order condition in equation (4) in equation (13) yields a 
simple expression for the dead weight loss from the obesity externality: 
 
(14) ( ) ( )*.DWL U P W ω ω′ ′≈ − Δ0  
 
Equation (14) shows that the deadweight loss is proportional to two crucial 
factors: the extent to which bodyweight deviates from the optimal due to pooled 
health insurance when individuals do not bear the full medical care costs of 
obesity, ωΔ , and the responsiveness of medical care expenditures to changes in 
weight, ( )*P W ω′ −0 .  The dead weight loss from the obesity externality is zero if 
individual weight choice does not respond to subsidies for obesity or if medical 
expenditures do not change with bodyweight.   
 
While several estimates of ( )*P W ω′ −0  are available from the public health and 
economics literatures there is no work that quantifies ωΔ . To estimate ωΔ , 
ideally we would like to know: (1) bodyweight under pooled insurance when the 
consumer is shielded from the medical care costs of obesity and (2) under risk-
adjusted premiums when the individual faces the full medical care costs of 
obesity. Unfortunately, we can observe the former but not the latter as very few 
insurance plans risk rate insurance premiums based on obesity. Therefore, to 
estimate the latter quantity we rely on two other margins that affect the extent 
to which individuals bear the medical care costs of obesity. First, we examine 
whether consumers with more generous insurance, who are partially shielded 
from medical care costs of obesity, are heavier than those with less generous 
insurance. Next we examine, the effect of insurance status on the extensive 
margin, that is, whether the uninsured, who face the full medical care costs of 
obesity, are lighter than the insured.   
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3 The Intensive Margin: Increasing Generosity of Coverage 
Using data from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment (HIE), we are able to 
examine the effect of health insurance on body weight when people are 
randomly assigned to different levels of insurance coverage (the intensive 
margin).  In the HIE, which was conducted in six areas of the country during 
the late 1970s and early 1908s, approximately 2,000 non-elderly families were 
assigned to differing levels of insurance coverage.12  The purpose of the HIE was 
to determine the effects of patient cost sharing on medical care utilization and 
health.  The participants were assigned to different fee-for-service plans that 
varied along two dimensions:  the coinsurance rate (the fraction of billed 
charges paid by patients) and the maximum dollar expenditure (the maximum 
amount a family would spend on covered expenditures during a twelve month 
period).  The coverage was comprehensive in the sense that it included nearly 
all types of medical care. Participants remained enrolled in their assigned plan 
and were followed for either three (70%) or five years.  
 
The plans were characterized by four different coinsurance percentages – 0 
(often referred to as “free care”), 25%, 50%, and 95% - and three levels of 
maximum out of pocket spending – 5%, 10%, and 15% of family income up to a 
maximum of $1000.  In one plan, the MDE was set at $150 per individual and 
$450 per family (often referred to as the “individual deductible plan”).13  In this 
plan, the coinsurance rate was 95%.  In our empirical work, we categorize plans 
based on their coinsurance rate and control for the MDE.14  We categorize the 
individual deductible plan separately due to the more complicated structure of 
the MDE.   
 
                                                 
12 This description of the HIE is based on information from Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment 
Group, 1993. 
13 The HIE also included an analysis of the effects of enrolling in an HMO on the study outcomes.  Because 
it is difficult to measure the generosity of an HMO relative to a FFS plan, we drop these enrollees from the 
analysis.  
14 The coinsurance rate was constant across different types of services with one exception.  In one plan, the 
coinsurance rate was 25% for all services except outpatient mental health and dental, which had a 50% 
coinsurance rate.  We include this plan in the 25% coinsurance rate group. 
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In order to minimize participation bias, the investigators offered a participation 
incentive.  The participation incentive for a given family was defined as “the 
maximum loss risked by changing to the experimental plan from existing 
coverage”, and was intended to ensure that families were equally likely to 
participate independent of their prior health insurance status and the plan to 
which they were assigned  
 
The study collected data on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of 
enrollees as well as health status and medical care utilization both at baseline 
and during the experiment.  This information included enrollee height and 
weight both at baseline and at exit, and we use these measures to calculate 
BMI at each point in time for each enrollee.  We limit our analysis to adults 
(age>=21) and drop observations with missing data for key control variables 
(age, education, family income, race, gender, marital status, and self reported 
health status).  
 
Table 1 presents data on body weight by plan type.  We find no evidence of 
statistically significant differences by plan type in body weight, as measured by 
either BMI or obesity status, either at entry or at exit.  In addition, we find no 
evidence of differences across the plans in changes in these measures.  The 
directions of the differences between plans in changes in BMI, however, are 
consistent with the hypothesized effect.  In other words, enrollees in the free 
plan experienced the largest change in BMI over the study period (0.59) and the 
difference in change in BMI between the free plan (0.59) and the 25% 
coinsurance plan (0.33) is statistically significant at p<=0.06.15  The results are 
less consistent for the indicator of becoming obese.  In this case, the differences 
across plans based on their level of cost sharing are not consistent across 
plans. 
 
                                                 
15 This finding is consistent with results reported by the HIE which find that, while the difference in 
weight/height^2 at exit between enrollees in the free plan and enrollees in the other plans was not 
statistically significant, the direction of the effect favored the cost sharing plans (page 198, Newhouse and 
the Insurance Experiment Group, 1993).   
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In Appendix Table 1, we document some differences across the plans in enrollee 
characteristics despite random assignment.  In particular, average family 
income varies across the plans, and correspondingly, the participation incentive 
as well.  In addition, enrollee assignment to plans is not balanced by site. 
 
In Table 2, we determine whether the estimates of the effects of plan cost-
sharing are influenced by these differences by controlling for them in 
multivariate models.  The multivariate models also allow us to control for the 
enrollees’ maximum dollar expenditure.  We estimate models with two different 
dependent variables:  BMI change per year (to control for differences across 
enrollees in their enrollment period) and an indicator of whether an individual 
became obese during the study period.  We estimate three versions of each 
model.  In the first, we control for plan characteristics only (the dummy variable 
indicating the coinsurance rate and the MDE).  In the second, we add the 
controls for individual characteristics presented in Appendix Table 1.  In the 
third, we control for both individual characteristics and aspects of study design 
including the site and the enrollee’s participation incentive.  We estimate the 
models using least squares.  The results from the model of the probability of 
becoming obese are similar when we estimate a maximum likelihood logit 
model. 
 
The results from the multivariate models are substantively similar to those from 
the unadjusted comparisons (Table 2).  While people randomly assigned to 
plans with cost sharing experienced a smaller annual change in BMI during the 
experiment relative to those assigned to the free plan, the effect is statistically 
significant only in the case of the plan with the 25% coinsurance rate.  And in 
this case, the effect is quite small.  A 0.175 reduction in BMI represents less 
than 1% of BMI at entry among this group.  Correspondingly, we do not find 
consistent evidence of differences by plan type in the probability of becoming 
obese during the study period.  The direction of the effect varies by plan and 
none of the estimates are statistically significant.   
 
4 The Extensive Margin: Insured vs. Uninsured 
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While the Rand data allow us to examine the responsiveness of body weight to a 
change in the generosity of coverage, the fact that everyone in the experiment 
had health insurance coverage leaves open the possibility of an effect along the 
extensive margin.  In other words, the responsiveness of body weight to any 
insurance relative to none may be greater than the responsiveness to changes 
in the generosity of that coverage. 
 
4.1   Methods 
We use instrumental variables (IV) regressions to estimate the causal effects of 
private and public insurance coverage on body weight as measured by BMI and 
obesity status. If our instruments are valid, IV methods purge the estimates of 
confounding due to observable and unobservable characteristics.  We first 
estimate linear instrumental variables model estimated via two stage least 
squares. These models are widely used and a powerful tools in such contexts.  
However, for nonlinear and limited dependent variable models in general, the 
linear IV model may either be inappropriate or not work well in practice.  
Specifically, in our case, although the outcomes of interest are either binary or 
linear, the endogenous regressors (dummy variables for private and public 
insurance) are limited dependent variables.  A linear IV model would treat the 
endogenous regressors as if they were linear and unrelated, when in fact the 
insurance choices are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.  
 
To address the discrete nature of our data, we next estimate a nonlinear 
instrumental variables model using latent factors to account for selection on 
unobservables.  Our model respects the multinomial nature of the endogenous 
regressors as well as the binary or linear nature of the outcome.  Specifically, 
we assume that the endogenous regressors have a multinomial logit form, while 
the outcome equations have logit and normal (linear) forms respectively.  Then, 
latent factors are incorporated into the equations to allow for unobserved 
influences on insurance choice to affect outcomes and their joint distribution 
specified (Deb and Trivedi, 1997). 
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The main computational problem is that the joint distribution, which involves a 
multidimensional integral, does not have a closed form solution.  This difficulty 
can be addressed using simulation-based estimation. Using normally 
distributed random draws for the latent variables, a simulated likelihood 
function for the data is defined and its parameters estimated using a Maximum 
Simulated Likelihood Estimator. Because of the complexity of our model and 
the large sample size, standard simulation methods are quite slow.  Therefore, 
we adapt an acceleration technique that uses quasi-random draws based on 
Halton sequences. The formulation, estimation methods and exposition borrows 
heavily from Deb and Trivedi (2004).  
 
The model is represented by 2 sets of equations. In the first set of equations, 
the insurance choices (private, public or uninsured) are represented by a 
multinomial logit model. The second equation, representing the outcome, is 
modeled as OLS (BMI as outcome) or logit (obese status as outcome) model. In 
this model, the choice of insurance and outcome are linked because insurance 
choices are regressors in the outcome module and because there are common 
unobservable (latent) factors. 
 
Let *y denote the propensity underlying the observed values of outcome, y  (in 
the case of BMI, yy =* ). Let privateand public be a binary variables 
representing public and private insurance coverage. The outcome equation is 
formulated as: 
 
(15) ελλγγβ +++++= pubpvt llPublicprivatexy 2121*  
 
Where, x  is a set of exogenous covariates and β , 1γ , and 2γ  are parameters 
associated with the exogenous covariates and insurance variables. The error 
term is partitioned into ε , an independently distributed random error, and 
latent factors pvtl and publ  which denote unobserved characteristics common to 
individual’s choice of insurance and outcome of that individual. 1λ  and 2λ  are 
factor loadings or parameters associated with the latent factors that capture the 
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degree of correlation between unobserved determinants of insurance choice and 
outcomes. 
 
The transformation from *y given in (15) to the observed random variable y  is 
through an appropriate distribution function f such that: 
(16) )(),,,,|Pr( 2121
*
pubpvtpubpvt llPubPvtxfllPubPvtxyy λλγγβ ++++==  
 
In the case of the binary outcome, f is assumed to be the extreme value 
distribution function, that is, the outcome equation is a logit model. In the 
linear case f is the identity link. 
 
Following the multinomial logit framework (McFadden, 1980, p. S15), the 
probability of choosing in private insurance, public insurance or remaining 
uninsured is formulated as: 
(17) 
),|1Pr(),|1Pr(1),|0,0Pr(
)(),|1Pr(
)(),|1Pr(
1
1
publicpvt
pubpubpublic
pvtpvtpvt
lzpubliclzprivatezpublicprivate
lzglzpublic
lzglzprivate
=−=−===
+==
+==
δα
δα
 
where z denotes exogenous covariates in the insurance choice model. We 
denote covariates in this site-choice module by z  and covariates in the outcome 
equation by x  to highlight the fact that they contain the instrumental variables 
in the empirical analysis. We use the extreme value distribution for g so that 
the model for insurance coverage is a multinomial logit. 
 
Because the latent factors pvtl and publ  enter both choice of insurance (17) and 
outcome (16) equations, they capture the unobserved factors that induce self-
selection into insurance and are also correlated with unobservable factors 
related to outcomes. Under these assumptions, the joint distribution of 
selection and outcome variables, conditional on the common latent factors, is 
simply the product of the functions described in equations (16) and (17).  
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The problem in estimation arises because the common latent factors pvtl and publ  
are unknown. We assume that these latent factors are normally distributed. 
Given this assumption the latent factors can be can be integrated out of the 
joint density. For example, the joint density of observing outcome y and 1=Pvt  
equals: 
(18)  
*
1 2 1 2 1
Pr( , 1| , )
( ) ( ) ( )pvt pub pvt pvt pvt pvt
y y private x z
f x private public l l g z l l dlβ γ γ λ λ α δ φ
= = =
+ + + + +∫  
Cast in this form, the unknown parameters of the model may be estimated by 
maximum likelihood. The main computational problem is that the integral in 
equation (18) does not have, in general, a closed form solution. But this 
difficulty can be addressed using simulation-based estimation (Gourieroux and 
Monfort, 1996) to numerically integrate equation (18). Because of the 
complexity of our model, standard simulation methods are quite slow. 
Therefore, we adapt an acceleration technique that uses quasi-random draws 
based on Halton sequences (Bhat, 2001; Train, 2002).We maximize the 
simulated likelihood using a quasi-Newton algorithm. 
 
4.2  Data and Instruments 
Data 
The primary data source for our analysis is the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY). The NLSY includes a nationally representative sample of 12,686 
people aged 14-22 years in 1979 who were surveyed annually until 1994, and 
biennially through 2004. Our study uses NLSY data from 1989-2004. We 
exclude the years prior to 1989 as well as 1991 because the survey did not 
collect information on health insurance status in those years. We further 
restrict the sample, excluding pregnant women. After these restrictions, 79; 876 
person-year observations (40; 223 male and 39; 653 female) were eligible to be 
included in the study sample. 
Instruments 
We use the two sets of instruments for insurance choice. The first set of 
instruments captures the distribution of firm size in every state and year. These 
data are obtained from the Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB) available online 
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at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/data.html. We use these data to 
construct 2 instruments at the state-year level: (1) percentage of workers 
employed in firms with 100 to 499 employees, (2) percentage of workers 
employed in firms with 500 or more employees. These instruments would be 
valid under 2 conditions. First, they should be strong predictor private 
insurance coverage. Second, they should affect weight choice only through their 
effect on insurance choice. In the next section, we show that the instruments 
are strong predictors of private insurance as large firms are more likely to cover 
employees. The second assumption cannot be directly tested, however, it seems 
unlikely that changes in firm size distribution within a state (our models have 
state fixed effects) would be related to weight choices, except through insurance 
coverage. However, one important caveat is that it is possible that obese 
workers might prefer to live in states with larger firms to enjoy the benefits of 
pooled health insurance at these firms. To the extent that this is true, our IV 
estimates will overestimate the effects of insurance on bodyweight and obesity.  
 
The second instrument captures generosity of Medicaid coverage. There has 
been a significant expansion of Medicaid eligibility during this period and there 
is significant variation across states in the pace at which these expansions have 
occurred. Prior research documents a strong association between Medicaid 
expansions and public insurance coverage. We use data from several years of 
CPS to construct this instrument. First, we regress a binary variable for 
Medicaid coverage on detailed information on demographics, family 
composition, income, and state*time fixed effects. The state*time fixed effects 
measure the generosity of Medicaid coverage in each state and year after 
controlling for other important determinants of Medicaid coverage. We posit 
that these state*time fixed effects essentially capture differences in Medicaid 
eligibility rules or enforcement of these rules. We use these fixed effects to 
create a predicted probability of Medicaid coverage for a standardized 
population and use these predicted probabilities as an instrument for public 
insurance coverage. Again, our instrument is valid if variation in our measure 
of Medicaid eligibility within a state in not correlated with unobserved 
determinants of obesity within a state. For example, our IV estimates would be 
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biased upwards if deteriorating economic conditions increased obesity rates and 
also prompted states to expand Medicaid eligibility. 
 
Finally, we also explored using state marginal income tax rates as an 
instrument for insurance coverage. The rational why one might choose to use 
taxes as an instrument is that since employer sponsored health insurance 
premiums are exempt from state and federal payroll taxes, the subsidy for 
employer sponsored insurance is greater in states with higher marginal income 
taxes. Consequently, states with higher marginal income tax rates should have 
a higher proportion of persons having employer provided insurance. 
Unfortunately, this was not true empirically. We found no significant 
relationship between state marginal income tax rates and insurance coverage. 
   
Other explanatory variables 
We include several other explanatory variables including race, age, gender, 
income, afqt scores and year fixed effects. All these variables are plausibly 
exogenous and important predictors of weight and insurance choices. In 
addition, in our preferred specifications we include state fixed effects to control 
for all time invariant differences across states. This is important as our 
instruments are measured at the state level.  
 
 
4.3   Results 
Table 3 presents the results from the second stage of the 2SLS regressions. 
Appendix Table 2 presents the first stage results. The aim of these regressions 
is to estimate the causal effect of public and private insurance on BMI and 
obesity. The first model presents results from the regression model without 
state fixed effects. The results show that both private and public insurance 
have no statistically significant effect on BMI. The point estimates for both 
public and private insurance are positive but are estimated imprecisely. This is 
despite the strong predictive power of the instruments in the first stage (F-stat = 
139]. The next model includes state fixed effects to capture time invariant 
differences across states. The point estimates from this model are implausibly 
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large and very imprecisely estimated. The results indicate that public and 
private insurance coverage reduce BMI by 3.8 and 7.7 points respectively. 
However, despite these large point estimates these estimates are statistically 
insignificant. These are classical symptoms of the weak instruments problem. 
In this specification the instruments are weak predictors of insurance coverage 
[F-Stat 2.9]. The last models present results from models with obese status as 
the outcome variable. The results are consistent with the BMI model. Public 
and private insurance coverage have no statistically significant effect on obesity 
and the point estimates from the specification with state fixed effects are 
implausibly large.  
 
Table 4 and Appendix Table 3 present the results from the results from the MLE 
models. These models are our preferred specification. As discussed earlier they 
have several advantages over the 2SLS models. The results from the first model 
show that both public and private insurance have a statistically significantly 
effect on BMI. The results indicate that private insurance increases BMI by 1.3 
points and public insurance increases BMI by 2.1 points. Both these effects are 
quite large and are precisely estimated. For example the effects of private 
insurance on BMI are similar to moving from the highest AFQT quartile to the 
lowest AFQT quartiles or moving from less than 8 years of education to more 
that 12 years of education. The second model includes state fixed effects. The 
results are virtually unchanged. The last two models use obesity as an outcome 
model. The results from these regressions are consistent with the BMI models – 
both public and private insurance increase obesity.      
 
5 Conclusion 
 
Our results indicate that health insurance does indeed make you fat.  While the 
evidence that more generous private insurance leads to increases in body 
weight is somewhat weak, primarily because the magnitude of the estimated 
effect is quite small, our estimates of the effect of having insurance, either 
public or private, are larger and more precise.   
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While other authors have come to a different conclusion using a similar 
approach (Markowitz and Rashad 2007), we demonstrate that the difference is 
likely due to the method of estimation.  When we estimate the model using two- 
stage least squares, which does not account for the discrete nature of the 
endogenous indicator of health insurance, our estimates are similar in the 
sense that we find little evidence that body weight is elastic with respect to 
insurance coverage.  Adopting an alternative maximum likelihood method of 
estimation, which handles explicitly the discrete endogenous variable, we reach 
a different conclusion.  Body weight is responsive to health insurance coverage. 
The estimate is both relatively large in magnitude and precise, and does not 
vary across the different model specifications.   
 
Our estimates suggest that, by insulating people from the costs of obesity-
related medical care expenditures, insurance coverage creates moral hazard in 
behaviors related to body weight.  These effects are larger in public insurance 
programs where premiums are not risk adjusted and smaller in private 
insurance markets where obese might pay for incremental medical care costs in 
the form of lower wages (Bhattacharya and Bundorf 2005).  By contrast, our 
estimates also suggest that making insurance more generous has no effect on 
body weight. Taken together, these findings indicate that providing incentives 
for healthy behaviors, especially among those with public coverage, might 
improve social welfare.
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Appendix A:  A Characterization of the Social Optimum 
 
In this section, we derive necessary conditions characterizing the socially 
optimal level of weight loss for a society of j = 1…J individuals.  Each has the 
following expected utility, taken from equation (1):  
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We define total social welfare,   , as the sum of expected utilities over all 
individuals in the society: 
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In (A-2), jγ  represents the Pareto weight that individual j has in the social 
welfare function.  In the social budget constraint, total income equals total 
expenditures on consumption plus total medical expenditures over all 
individuals.  Both income and the distribution of medical expenditures depend 
upon bodyweight decisions: 
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Equation (A-3) builds in our assumption that expectations about the 
distribution of medical expenditures in the population correspond to the 
observed distribution of expenditures.   
 
The social problem is to pick consumption and bodyweight for all individuals in 
every state of the world — { },   ,ij jC i jω ∀  — to maximize    subject to the social 
budget constraint.  To this end, we construct the following Lagrangian function, 
where λ  is the multiplier associated with the social budget constraint, (A-3): 
 
(A-4) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )             
J N
j i j j ij j j
j i
J N
j j i j j i ij
j i
L W U C
I W W M C
γ π ω γ ω
λ ω π ω
= =
= =
= − − Φ
⎧ ⎫− − − − +⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭
∑∑
∑ ∑
0
1 1
0 0
1 1
 
 
There are two sets of first order conditions: 
 
(A-5) ( )   ,j ij
ij
L U C i j
C
γ λ∂ ′= + = ∀∂ 0 , and 
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(A-6) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )               
N
i j j j ij j j
j i
N
j j i j j i ij
i
L W U C
I W W M C j
π ω γ γ ωω
λ ω π ω
=
=
∂ ′ ′= − − − Φ∂
⎛ ⎞′ ′+ − + − + = ∀⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑
∑
0
1
0 0
1
0
 
 
An immediate implication of (A-5) is that at the social optimum, each individual 
j in the society must set his (or her) consumption level to the same value, say 
*
jC , across all the N different health states: 
 
(A-7) *  ,ij jC C i j= ∀  
 
Applying (A-7) to (A-6) yields the following: 
 
(A-8) 
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* *
               
N
j j j i j j j j
i
N
j j i i j j
i
U C C W
I W M W j
γ λ π ω γ ω
λ ω π ω
=
=
′ ′− + − − Φ
⎛ ⎞′ ′+ − + − = ∀⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑
∑
0
1
0 0
1
0
 
 
By definition, ( )N i j j
i
Wπ ω
=
− =∑ 0
1
1, so we have ( )N i j j
i
Wπ ω
=
′ − =∑ 0
1
0 .  Furthermore, 
differentiating equation (7), which defines the risk-adjusted premium, ( )j jP W ω−0 ,  yields the fact that: 
 
(A-9) ( ) ( )  Nj j i j j i
i
P W W M jω π ω
=
′ ′− = − − ∀∑0 0
1
. 
 
These equations and (A-5) permit a further simplification of equation (A-8): 
 
(A-10) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )*  j j j j j jU C I W P W jω ω ω′ ′ ′ ′−Φ − − − − = ∀0 0 0  
 
Hence, the social optimum requires each individual to equate the marginal 
(utility) costs of weight loss with the marginal (utility) benefits from the weight 
loss—an increase in income and a reduction in expected medical costs.   
 
One feasible allocation that meets (A-10) would set consumption for each 
individual equal to income, less the risk-adjusted premium given weight: 
 
(A-11) ( ) ( )*j j j j jC I W P W jω ω= − − − ∀0 0  
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It is easy to show that this allocation would be optimal for some distribution of 
initial bodyweight, { }jW0 , and some set of Pareto weights, { }jγ .  In this 
allocation, there are no transfers between individuals with different initial 
bodyweights.  Other optimal and feasible allocations are possible, but these 
would involve fixed transfers between individuals that do not depend upon final 
bodyweight (though they might depend upon initial bodyweight).  Optimal 
transfers would clearly vary with { }jγ , though all optimal allocations would 
need to obey condition (A-10). 
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Figure 1: Model Timeline 
 
 
Initial Weight W0, 
received 
Insurance Starts 
Earn Income 
Choose weight loss: ω 
Health Observed 
Choose consumption: C 
Insurance Ends 
time 
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Table 1:  Study Population Characteristics by Plan Assignment         
           
  All Free   25%   50%   95%   Individual
N         2,461           824            492            167  
         
442            536  
BMI at Entry 24.79 24.80  24.70  24.89  24.73  24.89
 (4.53) (4.45)  (4.81)  (4.02)  (4.41)  (4.63)
BMI at Exit 25.31 25.39  25.03  25.43  25.31  25.40
 (4.78) (4.64)  (4.76)  (4.63)  (5.16)  (4.76)
BMI Change 0.52 0.59  0.33  0.55  0.58  0.51
 (2.45) (2.46)  (2.16)  (2.42)  (2.75)  (2.44)
BMI Change Per Year 0.15 0.16  0.10  0.15  0.17  0.15
 (0.74) (0.74)  (0.62)  (0.66)  (0.86)  (0.74)
Obese at Entry 0.12 0.12  0.12  0.13  0.11  0.13
           
Obese at Exit 0.14 0.14  0.13  0.16  0.12  0.15
           
Became Obese 0.04 0.04  0.03  0.06  0.04  0.05
                      
Note:  Used chi-square test for categorical variables and t-test of mean relative to free for continuous variables.  No differences are 
statistically significant. 
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Table 2:  The Effect of Insurance Coverage on Body Weight and Obesity - Randomized Health Plan Assignment  
        
 BMI Change Per Year  Became Obese 
  (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
25% Coinsurance Rate -0.109 -0.175 -0.179  -0.005 -0.012 -0.016 
 [1.48] [2.20]* [2.25]*  [0.23] [0.57] [0.71] 
50% Coinsurance Rate -0.062 -0.139 -0.132  0.025 0.016 0.007 
 [0.64] [1.36] [1.26]  [0.92] [0.56] [0.24] 
95% Coinsurance Rate -0.032 -0.111 -0.114  0 -0.01 -0.015 
 [0.40] [1.28] [1.31]  [0.00] [0.41] [0.61] 
Individual Deductible -0.037 -0.071 -0.079  0.01 0.007 0.004 
 [0.72] [1.33] [1.45]  [0.68] [0.46] [0.25] 
Maximum $ Expenditure 0 0 0  0 0 0 
 [0.70] [1.65] [1.93]  [0.35] [0.18] [0.73] 
Constant 0.161 0.442 0.39  0.051 0.168 0.197 
  [6.32]** [1.92] [1.66]  [2.88]** [2.59]** [2.95]** 
Includes Individual Controls  X X   X X 
Includes Site Effects and Participation Incentive   X    X 
Observations 2441 2441 2441  2441 2441 2441 
R-squared 0 0.01 0.01  0 0.01 0.01 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets        
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%        
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Table 3: Effect of Public and Private Insurance on BMI and Obesity: 2SLS Results    
         
 BMI-No State FE BMI-State FE Obese-No State FE Obese-State FE 
 coefficient 
std 
error coefficient 
std 
error coefficient std error coefficient std error 
Public Ins. 0.7002 1.2298 -3.8172 10.7426 -0.0840 0.0931 -0.1239 0.7831
Private Ins. 0.9065 0.7741 -7.7786 4.8906 0.0168 0.0570 -0.4573 0.3595
Year == 1990 0.2208 0.0765 0.2926 0.1095 0.0119 0.0056 0.0151 0.0077
Year == 1992 0.5856 0.0889 0.5303 0.1086 0.0330 0.0066 0.0300 0.0077
Year == 1993 0.7054 0.1047 0.4364 0.3817 0.0415 0.0078 0.0188 0.0272
Year == 1994 0.7935 0.1091 0.6006 0.3900 0.0485 0.0082 0.0298 0.0279
Year == 1996 0.9836 0.1129 0.8122 0.2803 0.0525 0.0085 0.0378 0.0200
Year == 1998 1.2102 0.1216 1.2379 0.2245 0.0708 0.0092 0.0687 0.0162
Year == 2000 1.6074 0.1339 1.7121 0.1918 0.0999 0.0102 0.1041 0.0139
Year == 2002 1.7830 0.1506 1.6174 0.2067 0.1029 0.0114 0.0919 0.0148
Year == 2004 1.8644 0.1740 1.5763 0.2957 0.1091 0.0132 0.0889 0.0212
Age 0.3858 0.0652 0.4975 0.1064 0.0230 0.0049 0.0284 0.0077
Age Square -0.0039 0.0009 -0.0051 0.0013 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001
Nonwhite 1.3416 0.0657 1.0474 0.4127 0.0789 0.0050 0.0556 0.0295
Male 0.8224 0.0857 0.4774 0.6630 -0.0151 0.0065 -0.0214 0.0484
Educ 0 to 8 yrs 1.1532 0.2615 -1.1703 1.2250 0.0732 0.0188 -0.0633 0.0890
Educ 8 to 12 yrs 0.4730 0.0959 -0.4040 0.5038 0.0322 0.0072 -0.0222 0.0363
Income ($000s) -0.0007 0.0002 0.0013 0.0012 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001
AFQT Quartile 1 1.0038 0.2004 -0.8140 1.1223 0.0666 0.0149 -0.0549 0.0801
AFQT Quartile 2 0.6752 0.1019 -0.1584 0.4249 0.0397 0.0075 -0.0106 0.0309
AFQT Quartile 3 0.3557 0.0658 0.0390 0.1703 0.0215 0.0050 0.0023 0.0124
Constant 14.8588 1.2164 20.5830 3.4176 -0.4152 0.0910 -0.0761 0.2477
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Table 4: Effect of Public and Private Insurance on BMI and Obesity: MLE Results    
         
 BMI-No State FE BMI-State FE Obese-No State FE Obese-State FE 
 coefficient std error coefficient std error coefficient std error coefficient std error 
Private Ins. 1.269 0.093 1.309 0.094 0.847 0.245 0.987 0.311
Public Ins. 2.092 0.151 2.190 0.154 0.667 0.205 0.873 0.264
Year == 1990 0.214 0.076 0.217 0.076 0.125 0.053 0.130 0.056
Year == 1992 0.586 0.089 0.583 0.089 0.318 0.060 0.332 0.066
Year == 1993 0.667 0.092 0.655 0.092 0.366 0.064 0.376 0.072
Year == 1994 0.751 0.098 0.744 0.098 0.406 0.067 0.420 0.076
Year == 1996 0.957 0.108 0.956 0.108 0.443 0.075 0.462 0.086
Year == 1998 1.187 0.120 1.187 0.120 0.544 0.082 0.565 0.095
Year == 2000 1.593 0.133 1.594 0.133 0.718 0.095 0.752 0.116
Year == 2002 1.777 0.149 1.783 0.149 0.762 0.107 0.803 0.132
Year == 2004 1.849 0.170 1.851 0.170 0.806 0.118 0.848 0.144
Age 0.378 0.064 0.376 0.064 0.190 0.036 0.196 0.039
Age Square -0.004 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.001
Nonwhite 1.308 0.050 1.325 0.052 0.482 0.044 0.531 0.065
Male 0.906 0.041 0.918 0.041 0.028 0.038 0.048 0.044
Educ 0 to 8 yrs 1.199 0.156 1.166 0.155 0.598 0.106 0.638 0.131
Educ 8 to 12 yrs 0.470 0.049 0.505 0.049 0.244 0.040 0.286 0.053
Income ($000s) -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.004 0.002 -0.004 0.002
AFQT Quartile 1 0.965 0.077 0.877 0.078 0.476 0.067 0.454 0.079
AFQT Quartile 2 0.694 0.065 0.650 0.066 0.327 0.047 0.316 0.054
AFQT Quartile 3 0.366 0.057 0.345 0.058 0.180 0.036 0.170 0.039
Constant 14.671 1.089 14.494 1.093 -7.108 0.830 -7.508 1.052
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Appendix Table 1:  RAND Enrollees Demographic and Health Status Covariates are Balanced at Start of Experiment   
           
  All Free   25%   50%   95%   Individual 
N         2,461          824            492            167            442            536  
Age (Years) 37.36 37.85  36.91  38.35  37.35  36.70
 (11.18) (11.51)  (10.69)  (11.16)  (11.14)  (11.14)
Education (Years of School Completed) 12.34 12.15  12.48  12.47  12.41  12.39
 (3.03) (3.20)  (2.91)  (3.07)  (2.87)  (3.00)
Family Income (Year Preceding Enrollment) 11524 11135  11879 * 12993 ** 11654  11229
 (5772) (5734)  (5785)  (5825)  (5791)  (5710)
Participation Incentive Offered at Enrollment 461.17 175.32  702.81 ** 811.14 ** 733.22 ** 345.40
 (370) (238)  (281)  (324)  (348)  (211)
Race - White 0.88         0.87           0.87           0.92           0.86           0.88  
Race - Black 0.11         0.12           0.11           0.07           0.13           0.11  
Race - Other 0.01         0.01           0.02           0.01           0.01           0.01  
Married 0.80         0.81           0.81           0.83           0.77           0.79  
Female 0.54         0.54           0.53           0.56           0.57           0.53  
Self Reported Health Status - Excellent 0.45         0.45           0.45           0.49           0.46           0.45  
Self Reported Health Status - Good 0.43         0.42           0.43           0.40           0.43           0.45  
Self Reported Health Status - Fair 0.09         0.10           0.10           0.10           0.09           0.07  
Self Reported Health Status - Poor 0.02         0.03           0.01           0.02           0.02           0.02  
Self Reported Health Status - Missing 0.01         0.01           0.01              -             0.01           0.00  
 
 39
Appendix Table 2: First Stage Results for 2SLS models      
         
 Public-No State FE Public-State FE Private-No State FE Private-State FE 
 coefficient std error coefficient std error coefficient std error coefficient std error 
% in firms 0 to 499 0.5466 0.0981 0.2126 0.2822 2.3617 0.1736 0.8901 0.4992
% in firms 500+ -0.0248 0.0315 0.1117 0.1035 0.7434 0.0558 0.3727 0.1831
Pr. Medicaid Enrollment 0.2074 0.0125 0.0650 0.0233 -0.2722 0.0221 -0.1143 0.0412
Year == 1990 0.0030 0.0038 0.0034 0.0038 0.0057 0.0067 0.0058 0.0066
Year == 1992 -0.0127 0.0044 -0.0037 0.0046 0.0080 0.0077 -0.0008 0.0082
Year == 1993 0.0240 0.0045 0.0345 0.0048 -0.0395 0.0079 -0.0454 0.0085
Year == 1994 0.0190 0.0048 0.0334 0.0054 -0.0276 0.0084 -0.0358 0.0095
Year == 1996 -0.0027 0.0053 0.0168 0.0063 -0.0108 0.0094 -0.0242 0.0111
Year == 1998 -0.0045 0.0057 0.0081 0.0066 -0.0024 0.0100 -0.0045 0.0116
Year == 2000 -0.0117 0.0061 -0.0019 0.0075 -0.0020 0.0109 0.0026 0.0133
Year == 2002 -0.0144 0.0067 -0.0004 0.0079 -0.0252 0.0118 -0.0259 0.0139
Year == 2004 -0.0124 0.0075 0.0083 0.0091 -0.0401 0.0133 -0.0431 0.0161
Age 0.0024 0.0028 0.0026 0.0028 0.0115 0.0050 0.0115 0.0050
Age Square 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
Nonwhite 0.0384 0.0021 0.0452 0.0022 -0.0489 0.0037 -0.0604 0.0038
Male -0.0581 0.0018 -0.0591 0.0018 -0.0099 0.0031 -0.0093 0.0031
Educ 0 to 8 yrs 0.0444 0.0058 0.0486 0.0058 -0.2875 0.0103 -0.2891 0.0103
Educ 8 to 12 yrs 0.0314 0.0021 0.0330 0.0021 -0.1177 0.0037 -0.1217 0.0037
Income ($000s) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
AFQT Quartile 1 0.0991 0.0032 0.1016 0.0032 -0.2578 0.0057 -0.2532 0.0057
AFQT Quartile 2 0.0166 0.0028 0.0166 0.0028 -0.1049 0.0049 -0.1000 0.0050
AFQT Quartile 3 0.0039 0.0026 0.0040 0.0026 -0.0393 0.0046 -0.0363 0.0046
Constant -0.2159 0.0550 -0.2087 0.0954 0.1500 0.0973 0.4747 0.1688
F-statistic 139.14 2.91 120.51 4.52 
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Appendix Table 3: First Stage Results for MLE models      
         
 Public-No State FE Public-State FE Private-No State FE Private-State FE 
 coefficient
std 
error coefficient std error coefficient std error coefficient std error 
% in firms 0 to 499 30.8556 2.4072 4.3208 7.6902 19.1894 1.3751 7.3312 3.9023
% in firms 500+ 4.3796 0.7933 1.6022 2.7916 5.2915 0.3981 2.9991 1.4132
Pr. Medicaid Enrollment 4.4842 0.3433 2.6147 0.6278 -0.9681 0.1700 -0.5031 0.3142
Year == 1990 0.3162 0.1116 0.3262 0.1127 0.0007 0.0489 0.0050 0.0492
Year == 1992 -0.0120 0.1262 0.1355 0.1351 -0.1021 0.0582 -0.1165 0.0621
Year == 1993 0.4193 0.1160 0.6246 0.1271 -0.2763 0.0581 -0.2648 0.0642
Year == 1994 0.3185 0.1244 0.6093 0.1416 -0.2482 0.0632 -0.2332 0.0726
Year == 1996 -0.0108 0.1413 0.3621 0.1672 -0.3029 0.0729 -0.3035 0.0868
Year == 1998 0.0382 0.1503 0.3687 0.1769 -0.3046 0.0795 -0.2501 0.0929
Year == 2000 -0.0818 0.1633 0.2923 0.2035 -0.4447 0.0911 -0.3552 0.1108
Year == 2002 -0.2835 0.1747 0.1370 0.2090 -0.7410 0.1012 -0.6743 0.1184
Year == 2004 -0.3777 0.1922 0.2090 0.2387 -0.9700 0.1175 -0.8876 0.1392
Age 0.0110 0.0744 0.0206 0.0756 0.0283 0.0390 0.0292 0.0393
Age Square 0.0005 0.0010 0.0003 0.0011 -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0006
Nonwhite 0.6359 0.0498 0.7414 0.0523 -0.1566 0.0274 -0.2274 0.0287
Male -1.2173 0.0510 -1.2798 0.0518 -0.8610 0.0600 -0.8638 0.0606
Educ 0 to 8 yrs -0.4444 0.1125 -0.3718 0.1149 -1.3949 0.0734 -1.4182 0.0736
Educ 8 to 12 yrs 0.0239 0.0614 0.0572 0.0630 -0.6009 0.0330 -0.6471 0.0330
Income ($000s) -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
AFQT Quartile 1 1.2465 0.1160 1.3352 0.1183 -1.0656 0.0556 -1.0274 0.0574
AFQT Quartile 2 0.8320 0.1115 0.8737 0.1136 -0.6747 0.0432 -0.6411 0.0441
AFQT Quartile 3 0.6693 0.1125 0.6819 0.1140 -0.3459 0.0416 -0.3292 0.0420
Constant -11.4118 1.4551 -6.5811 2.5957 -3.4054 0.7344 -0.8305 1.3061
 
